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Abstract
Im Mittelpunkt des Beitrags stehen die
Ergebnisse der ukrainischen Parlaments-
wahlen von 2006. Sie spiegeln in man-
cherlei Hinsicht den Stand der demokra-
tischen Entwicklung wider. Dieser
Prozess kann jedoch nicht als ausschließ-
liches Ergebnis der Präsidentschaft
Juschtschenkos angesehen werden. Er ist
vielmehr das Resultat von Entwicklun-
gen, die mit der Erlangung der Unabhän-
gigkeit der Ukraine einsetzten. Dies wird
anhand des institutionellen, politischen
und sozialen Wandels aufgezeigt.
This article aims to assess the perspectives for a democratic evolution of Ukraine
in the light of the 2006 elections. In this respect, it maintains that a Yanukovych
premiership shall not have much weight on the democratic evolution of Ukraine
since democratization, rather than having happened overnight, was consolidated
– albeit slowly – over the fifteen-year independence period through the rise of a
strong opposition and civil society developments, of which the 2004 Orange
Revolution is only the most visible result. The main focus of this article is on po-
litical pluralism, which will be explored through qualitative and quantitative
analysis, examining the results of the elections and the very nature of Ukrainian
political parties. This examination will also give the possibility of focusing on oth-
er three crucial elements, namely constitutional reform, improvement of civil so-
ciety, and political attitude. Thus, the article is structured on three main points:
Firstly, from section I to IV, it shows the results of the 2006 elections and ana-
lyzes the dynamics between elected parties, maintaining that democratic consol-
idation may not be negatively affected by their results; secondly, from section V
to VIII, it gathers historical evidence by drawing from the Ukrainian political his-
tory after independence to show how democratic change happened far before
Yushchenko’s election in 2004. Finally, in sections IX to XI, it assesses the limits
of the insofar democratic reforms as hindered by a political culture that still feels
soviet legacy.
I. Context: The First ‘Democratic Elections’ in Ukraine 
Diplomatic missions in Kiev, the OSCE and most of the Western world watched
the 2006 elections in Ukraine with deep interest. The purpose was to under-
stand to what extent the country, further to the Orange Revolution alterations,
had enforced the changes that would foster a democratic transition.1
Nevertheless, the fact that the political elite is advancing far slower than the rest
of the population, which is maturing very rapidly, has often been ignored.2
Indeed, after having congratulated Viktor Yushchenko, the first “democratic”
president of Ukraine by the most “fair and democratic elections” in Ukraine
since its independence,3 a wave of uncertainty rose up when Yushchenko de fac-
to refused to acknowledge the results by not respecting the agreements of the
‘Orange Coalition’ by failing to appoint Yuliya Tymoshenko as prime minister.
Furthermore, during the political crisis stalemate (April–August 2006) it be-
came increasingly likely that Yushchenko himself choses and appoints as PM his
main adversary during the 2004 elections, a man who gathered almost the other
half of the Ukrainian electorate as illustrated in Table 1, who he had publicly ac-
cused to have stolen the presidential elections two years before, and who was
largely criticized in Europe and the USA for his authoritarian rule and lack of
honesty.
A sort of rehabilitation happened after the proposition of Yanukovych as
prime minister and his appointment on August 2, 2006, leading most countries
that had refused to acknowledge him as president in 2004 to assert their readi-
ness to work with him for a prosperous future.4 In other words, the West is now
accepting – although it would have no legal basis to refuse – Yanukovych, one of
the main actors in the 2004 election falsifications, a man who was alleged to re-
press civil society, and who wanted to use the force to disperse the Orange pro-
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1 Ukrainian Elections Key to Democratic Progress. In: IFES Press Release, 1 March
2006; Ukrainian Elections Free and Fair, Consolidating Democratic Breakthrough. In:
OSCE Press Release, 27 March 2006; Democracy and the Rule of Law in Ukraine. In:
UNIAN Analysis and Commentary, 11 August 2006.
2 Afterglow of the Passing Epoch. In: Zerkalo nedeli no.12 (591), 1 April 2006.
3 “Yushchenko hailed the vote as the most fair and democratic ever held in Ukraine”
and the head of the OSCE monitoring mission seemed to agree. Cf. Ukraine:
Yushchenko Headed for Defeat in Parliamentary Elections. In: Radio Free Europe, 26
March 2006. Even Charles Tannock, a British deputy, said the procedures followed by
Ukrainian authorities surpassed those of Britain. Cf. Ukraine: Elections Receive High
Acclaim from EU Monitors. In: Radio Free Europe, 28 March 2006.
4 Ukraine: Former US Ambassador says West can Work with Yanukovych. In: Radio
Free Europe, 31 July 2006.
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5 The crisis of the soviet ideology has led liberal democracy to remain the main – if not
the only – political ideology in the world. According to Michael McFaul in “Democracy
and Democracy Promotion as International Norms” (http://iis-db.stanford.edu/
pubs/20743/DemocracyasInternatonalNorm-WQ-92004.pdf, last accessed 20 Octo-
ber 2006) every country is in favor of liberal democracy, at least ideologically, and
Ukraine is no exception. As a result, according to the “official” discourse, democratiza-
Number of
interviewees
For
Yushchenko
For
Yanukovych
Against
both Total
Western region
Incomplete Secondary 811 94.0 5.4 0.6 100.0
Complete Secondary 1541 92.4 6.7 0.9 100.0
Vocational Training 2 347 92.8 6.3 0.9 100.0
University Degree 
(complete or incomplete) 1805 89.6 9.0 1.5 100.0
Central region
Incomplete Secondary 882 82.2 15.2 2.6 100.0
Complete Secondary 1958 80.7 16.2 3.1 100.0
Vocational Training 2 899 82.8 14.6 2.6 100.0
University Degree 
(complete or incomplete) 2 564 81.6 15.6 2.8 100.0
Southern region
Incomplete Secondary 651 25.9 71.4 2.7 100.0
Complete Secondary 1395 27.5 68.9 3.6 100.0
Vocational Training 2 540 29.6 67.5 2.9 100.0
University Degree 
(complete or incomplete) 2 398 41.4 55.3 3.3 100.0
Eastern region
Incomplete Secondary 643 7.0 92.4 0.6 100.0
Complete Secondary 1 280 9.1 88.9 1.9 100.0
Vocational Training 2 443 10.6 87.7 1.7 100.0
University Degree 
(complete or incomplete) 2 042 22.7 73.9 3.4 100.0
Table 1: The Yushchenko-Yanukovych confrontation in the 2004 elections:
breakdown of votes by education in four regions of Ukraine (in %)
Source: Svitlana Oksamytna and Valeriy Khmelko, Regional Divisions of Ukraine in the
2004 Presidential Elections: Gender, Age and Educational Differences of Electoral Preferen-
ces (table 9). Available at www.kiis.com.ua, last accessed 9 November 2006.
testors, as the man who can continue the democratic transformation of the coun-
try “officially” started during the Yushchenko presidency.5
Fears that appointment of Viktor Yanukovych would mean a step backwards
for democracy in Ukraine according to this article are unmotivated and should
be considered with the fact that Ukrainian democratic improvements since 1991
are the result of political arm wrestling between opposed forces, rather than the
result of a lucid and determinate democratization process.6 Therefore, they do
not depend on the will of a single man; democratic consolidation or deconsolida-
tion will only partially depend on Yanukovych’s premiership, just as it depended
only partially on Yushchenko’s presidency. It is true that Yushchenko gave con-
crete form to most democratic desires, such as business reforms and a diminish-
ing of human rights abuses.7 But it is also true that the preconditions for this to
happen smoothly had been rising with the political evolutions of the country
since 1991. Media freedom, credited to Yushchenko, was an achievement of the
Orange Revolution as a result of initiatives by journalists themselves. Likewise,
the constitutional reform was only accepted by Yushchenko as a compromise to
resolve the crisis and be offered the chance of a new second round of elections;
we will explore this in the later sections.
There are several current features of the Ukrainian society that would not al-
low for a return to the past: opposition nowadays is quite solid, civil society is ac-
tive and political activism is increasing, as confirmed by the classification of
“free” by Freedom House (see Table 2). In addition, international attention on
the country has led to a limited and balanced influence by Russia and the West
that limits the way both actors can influence domestic policies, allowing for more
liberty of action of domestic forces.8
The general tendency of the country to political pluralism and democracy is
visible when one confronts the results of the 2006 elections – where the majori-
ty is formed without the presidential party that, despite the president’s favorable
position, is part of the opposition – and notices the political evolutions from the
past elections (Tables 3 and 4), in which such a situation was unlikely to happen,
as Leonid Kuchma was able to gather the interests of several clans backing dif-
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tion started many times in Ukraine; first during perestroika, then after the 1991 inde-
pendence and finally after the Yushchenko election. The challenge is to understand
what is intended in Ukraine for democracy. In this case we reckon with the Western
political discourse assessing Yushchenko as the main initiator of a democratic move-
ment in the country.
6 Commitment to democratic improvements was shown in most Eastern European coun-
tries by forging a new generation of politicians with no links with the past. This phe-
nomenon, known as lustrism, is totally absent in Ukraine, where most of the commu-
nist elites have retained their position even after the 1991 ban of the communist party.
7 For a list of Yushchenko improvements see Taras Kuzio, Revisiting the Orange Revolu-
tion, Part One: Considerable Gains Made. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 21 November
2005.
8 On the role of foreign powers in Ukraine during the 2004 protests see Andrew Wilson,
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, New Haven/London 2006; Donnacha O’Bechean/
Abel Polese, Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004: Two Acts, One Play? In: Josette Baer
(ed.) Politics, Possibilities and Risks: Eastern Europe 2000–2005, Budapest 2007
(forthcoming).
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Table 2: Compared freedom in some of the former Soviet Republics
2002 2003 2004 2005
PR CL Status PR CL Status PR CL Status PR CL Status
Armenia 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF
Azerbaijan 6 5 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF
Belarus 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF
Kyrgyzstan 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 5 4 PF
Moldova 3 4 PF 3 4 PF 3 4 PF 3 4 PF
Russia 5 5 PF 5 5 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF
Ukraine 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 4 3 PF 3 2 F
PR= political rights; CL= civil rights; 7 is the lowest rate; PF= partially free; NF= not free; F=
free. Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Rating.
Table 3: Results of the 2006 elections
Party of Regions (center-left) 32.14 %
Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (right) 22.29 %
Nasha Ukraina Bloc (center-right) 13.95 %
Socialist Party of Ukraine (center-left) 5.69 %
Communist Party of Ukraine (left) 3.66 %
Source: www.cvk.gov.ua. These parties are the only ones that passed the 3 % barrier at na-
tional level to enter the parliament.
ferent political parties to push down the majority party – Nasha Ukraina – into
the opposition. 
It is useful to concentrate on the results of the 2006 elections before consider-
ing them in a historical perspective. In 2006 the Party of Regions, the predomi-
nate party in Ukraine, saw its leader, Viktor Yanukovych, appointed as prime
minister. To an external observer everything would seem in order, but reality is
far more complex. 
Many analysts have suggested that the real winner of these elections is Yuliya
Tymoshenko, former prime minister (February/September 2005) and leader of
the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc. If confronted with the 2002 elections results, the
BIUT registered a gain of around 15 % (in the 2002 elections Tymoshenko only
got 7.26 % of the votes). This performance almost gave Tymoshenko the post of
prime minister, after which she would have been confirmed the most powerful
lady of Ukraine and one of the most powerful women in the world, as she was
defined in August 2005.9
Before the elections, Tymoshenko had signed an “Orange” agreement with
two other parties, Nasha Ukraina and the Socialists. According to this agree-
ment, in the case of victory for the Orange Coalition the prime minister would
have been chosen out of the party that registered the best score in the 2006 elec-
tions, which did not happen. Understanding why Tymoshenko did not become
prime minister requires understanding much of the current situation of the
country. 
II. The Left in Ukraine
If assessing the winner is difficult, assessing the losers is easier, and Table 4 is
quite illuminating in this sense. The Communist Party of Ukraine has confirmed
its declination: in 1991, 85 % of the deputies in the Verkhovna Rada were mem-
bers of the Communists Party;10 after a ban from 1991 to 1993, the Communists
became the predominate party in the country with 12.72 % of the vote in the
1994 parliamentary elections; likewise, in 1998 they scored 24.65 %, and their
leader, Petro Simonenko, was the main presidential opponent at the 1999 elec-
tions with 37.8 % (against Kuchma’s 56.25 %) in the runoff of the elections.11
Since then, the Communist party has been in decline; it gathered 19.98 % in the
2002 elections and would not have been admitted into the Verkhovna Rada in
2006 had the minimum required not be changed to 3 % (until 2002 it was 4 %). 
The political ideology of the Communist Party is shared by another party,
which is also left-oriented but much more radical: the notorious Nataliya
Vitrenko Popular Opposition Bloc. Both parties have manifestos that continue
the pre-independence political vision and dwell on Soviet nostalgia, targeting
mainly older voters from the south and east of the country. In the 2006 elections
they had to share the conservative electorate,12 which led Nataliya Vitrenko to
gather 2.9 % of the vote and thus fail to enter the parliament. 
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9 In July 2005, “Forbes” magazine named Tymoshenko the third most powerful woman
in the world, after US Secretary of State Condolezza Rice and Chinese vice Premier
Wu Yi. Cf. Radio Free Europe, 20 March 2006.
10 Ukraina Partiynaya chast IV Kommunisticheskaya. In: Zerkalo nedeli no. 8 (383), 2
March 2002.
11 The result was judged to be extremely positive by the communist leader: Zerkalo nedeli
reports that Symonenko looked as happy as if he had won the elections, after having
succeeded in passing the first round and performed much better than he expected. Cf.
Ukraina partiynaya chast IV Kommunisticheskaya. In: Zerkalo nedeli no. 8 (383), 2
March 2002.
12 Both parties intended to oppose western aspirations of the country; for example they
were against no NATO and, EU integration, but for a “return to Soviet times”. In par-
ticular, Vitrenko was playing a classic of post-soviet societies: sans moi, le deluge.
Openly opposing Ukraine’s western aspiration did not at all prove to be a
good strategy; the Ne Tak Bloc, enjoying the experience and the connections of
two of the main politicians in the country, failed to pass the 3 % barrier.
Surprisingly enough, the alliance of the first Ukrainian president, Leonid
Kravchuk, and the former head of the Presidential Administration – and the
leader of the Social Democratic Party (united) and affiliated with the Kiev clan –
Viktor Medvedchuk, did not even appeal enough of those citizens sympathetic to
Russian as a state language and Ukrainian integration into the Common
Economic Space with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. 
When comparing election results since independence (Table 4), one can see
that most parties are short-lived, and a complex game of alliances makes the
overnight creation of parties possible, such as the For a United Ukraine Bloc cre-
ated just before the 2002 elections. The two Rukh branches joined to become
Nasha Ukraina in 2002 and one of them (Rukh Kostenko) participated inde-
pendently in the elections of 2006. The Party of Regions was part of For a
United Ukraine in 2002, and ran alone in 2006.
III. The Escalation of the Socialists and Yushchenko’s Decline
One of the main actors of these elections was Oleksandr Moroz, leader of the
Socialist Party, who was officially inspired by “European” socialist models like
Sweden and the Netherlands.13 Initially conceived as a party for those
Communists unwilling to revisit their ideology in 1991 when the Communist
Party was banned, it had to reinvent itself when, in 1993, most of its forces were
absorbed by the newly-legal Communist Party. “Not refusing Marxism, [the
Socialist Party] acknowledged the importance of a modern ideology”14 and took
the way of European socialism, while excluding extremist elements like Nataliya
Vitrenko and Volodymyr Marchenko from the party in 1995. Moroz, speaker of
the parliament from 1994 until 1998 and often in contrast with president
Kuchma, was given up as politically dead after the 1999 presidential elections.15
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13 At least, this was one of the main points in Moroz political slogans in the 2006 elec-
tions.
14 Ukraina partiynaya chast V. Sotsialisticheskaya partya Ukrainy. In: Zerkalo nedeli no.
9 (384), 8 March 2002.
15 Nataliya Vitrenko got was injured by a grenade during her political campaign.
Evidence was immediately produced against Moroz, who eventually did not undergo
any process, though this damaged his reputation and contributed to the failure of the
“Kaniv Four” group. See Ukraina partiynaya Chast V. Sotsialisticheskaya partya
Ukrainy. In: Zerkalo nedeli no. 9 (384), 9 March 2002; Ukraine: Opposition
Candidates Fail to Present United Front. In: Radio Free Europe, 19 October 1999;
Ukraine: 15 Candidates Race for Ukrainian Presidency. In: Radio Free Europe, 26
October 1999 and Ukraine: Grenade Blasts Still Resonate. In: Elections in Radio Free
Europe, 27 October 1999.
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“No part” means the party did not run in the election that year. If it ran as a member of an
electoral bloc, this is indicated, with its score. The Social Democratic party split happened
after the 1994 elections; therefore, the 0.36 % of votes, though reported twice in 1994,
refers to the party when still united. Source: www.cvk.gov.ua.
1994 1998 2002 2006
Communist Party
of Ukraine (CPU) 12.72 % 24.65 % 19.98 % 3.26 %
Rukh 5.15 % 9.40 % Split into two par-ties, both join NU
NU and Kostenko
Bloc
Socialist Party of
Ukraine (SPU) 3.09 %
For the truth
(8.55 %) 6.87 % 5.69 %
Peasant (Agrarian)
Party 2.74 %
For the truth
(8.55 %) 0.37 % 0.31 %
Republican Party 2.52 % National front bloc(2.72 %) BIUT
Ne Tak 
(1.01 %)
Progressive
Socialist Party of
Ukraine
SPU 4.05 % Vitrenko bloc(3.22 %)
Vitrenko Bloc 
(2.93 %)
Congress of
Ukrainian
Nationalists
1.25 % National front bloc(2.72 %) NU NU
Democratic Party 1.08 %
Bloc of Demo-
cratic Parties
(1.23 %)
Bloc with “Demo-
cratic Union Party”
(0.91 %)
Popular Deputies
of Ukraine 
(0.49 %)
Green Party No part 5.43 % 1.36 % 0.54 %
People’s Social
Democratic Party 0.36 % 5.01 % BIUT BIUT
Social Democratic
Party (United) 0.36 % 4.01 % 6.27 %
Ne TaK 
(1.01 %)
Nasha Ukraina
Bloc (NU) No part No part 23.57 % 13.95 %
For a United
Ukraine Bloc
(FUU)
No part No part 11.77 % No part
Party of Regions No part No part FUU Bloc 32.14 %
Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc (BIUT) No part No part 7.26 % 22.29 %
Table 4: Compared results of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. 
Moroz became one of the main figures of the opposition and an enemy of presi-
dent Kuchma after the audiotape scandal in 2000, remaining immune to the po-
tential attacks of the “blackmail state”.16 In 2000 he produced evidence that the
president was involved in the murder of a journalist investigating corruption in
high spheres of politics and officially challenged President Kuchma, contributing
to a re-awakening of civic activism movements17 that will have a major role in the
political history of Ukraine.
The last left-oriented party mentioned here is the Party of Regions, now the
predominate party in Ukraine. Headed by former prime minister (2002/2004)
and presidential candidate (2004) Viktor Yanukovych, the party won most of the
votes of the left electorate and de facto inherited all of the support of the former
“Party of Power.” 
The 2006 elections saw a strong decline in the popularity of president
Yushchenko and, consequently, in the performance of Nasha Ukraina. In 2002
Nasha Ukraina, created in January as an electoral bloc and later registered as a
political party,18 was able to do much better for two reasons: firstly, Mr.
Yushchenko was the most popular politician of the country and fully supported
by all the anti-Kuchma forces, and secondly, Nasha Ukraina could count on the
support of a wider spectrum of parties. 
An economist, former head of the national bank,19 and politically grown un-
der Kuchma (whom he considers a father),20 Yushchenko had led Ukraine onto
the path of economic stability by introducing a stable new currency, the hryvnya
to replace the karbovanets,21 and had been rewarded by being appointed prime
minister in 1999. 
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16 Pavlo Lazarenko was in the middle of a corruption process terminating with his sen-
tence of 10 years of prison. Yuliya Tymoshenko also was arrested for corruption; the
accusations were dismissed in 2005. This was the fate of most politicians in the oppo-
sition, according to Kuzio. See Taras Kuzio, Semi-Authoritarianism in Kuchma’s
Ukraine. In: Nicholas Hayoz/Andrej N. Lushnycky (eds.), Ukraine at a Crossroads,
Bern 2005, p. 33–61.
17 The “Ukraine without Kuchma” and “National Forum for Salvation” movements were
initiated by Moroz and Tymoshenko further to the audiotape scandal of November
2000 and were perpetuated through the mobilization of thousands of people demand-
ing president resignation. Although they were not successful, this meant the first
reawakening of civic society, with protestors setting up a tent camp in Maidan neza-
lezhnosti in Kiev.
18 Ukraine: Former PM Announces Formation of ‘Our Ukraine’ Opposition Bloc. In:
Radio Free Europe, 18 January 2002.
19 Viktor Yushchenko: “Ya ne monetarist, ya prosto bankir”. In: Zerkalo nedeli no. 38
(51), 23 September 1995. 
20 Ukraina Partiynaya chast II. “Nasha Ukraina”. In: Zerkalo nedeli no. 6 (381), 16
February 2002.
21 As a result of the galloping inflation, Karbovanets had replaced money with a partial
return to a barter system. Viktor Yushchenko succeeded in stabilizing the country’s
monetary system and re-introduced money based economy in 1996.
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Table 5: Political and socio-economic orientation of the electorate in 1998
Party
Average index of orientation
National and political
Oriented
Socio-economically
Oriented
Communist Party -0.62 -0.39
Rukh 0.89 0.56
Socialist and Agrarian Party 0.03 -0.13
Green Party 0.23 0.44
Popular Democratic Party 0.35 0.44
“Hromada” Union -0.03 0.07
Progressive Socialist Party -0.16 0.09
Social Democratic Party 0.29 0.38
Agrarian Party 0.33 -0.30
Reform and Order Party 0.94 0.77
Bloc Labor Ukraine -0.29 0.14
Source: Valeriy Khmelko/Nataliya Pohorila, Osoblyvosti elektorativ osnovnykh grup partiy
pered parlamentskymy vyboramy 1998 ta 2002 rokiv, www.kiis.com.ua, last accessed 9
November 2006.
Table 6: Political and socio-economic orientation of the electorate in 2001
Party voted
Average index of orientation
National and political 
oriented
Socio-economically
Oriented
Nasha Ukraina Bloc 0.99 0.27
Communist Party -0.29 -0.64
For a United Ukraine Bloc 0.06 0.20
Social Democratic Party -0.11 0.34
Women for the Future 0.22 -0.06
Green Party 0.20 0.11
Moroz Bloc 0.00 -0.24
Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc 0.39 0.22
Yabluko Party 0.14 0.20
Vitrenko Bloc -0.46 -0.02
Source: Valeriy Khmelko/Nataliya Pohorila, Osoblyvosti elektorativ osnovnykh grup partiy
pered parlamentskymy vyboramy 1998 ta 2002 rokiv, www.kiis.com.ua, last accessed 9
November 2006.
Despite having been sacked22 in 2001 for causing the main oligarchs discom-
fort, his reputation and his competent management of the Cabinet of Ministers
had earned him political and civil popularity. Opposition parties would sign a
declaration in his favor and collect thousands of signatures, but with little reso-
nance and he eventually left the post, declaring “I do not go out of politics, I go
out now in order to return.”23 He eventually succeeded in gathering a wide
range of allies and led Nasha Ukraina to receive the most votes of any Ukrainian
political party in 2002, thus receiving attention and sympathy at the domestic
and international levels, support that allowed him to challenge the results of the
2004 presidential elections and get elected in December 2004. 
After his election, Yushchenko first lost the support of some of the media,24
and then part of his electorate turned to Tymoshenko after the political split of
September 2005 – a major mistake of the president, according to Kuzio25 – lead-
ing to the dead end situation of 2006, when he faced the choice between
Tymoshenko and Yanukovych as prime minister. 
It must be said, however, that Nasha Ukraina by 2006 was a far more moder-
ate party, having passed from a right to a more centrist position and having lost
most of the extreme right electorate.26
This is visible in Tables 5 and 6: the most nationalistic parties were Rukh and
Reform and Order, which were both incorporated in Nasha Ukraina in 2002,
when the Yushchenko party became the most nationalist-oriented one. This was
not the case in 2006 since only the most moderate of the two Rukh parties
stayed with Nasha Ukraina and Reforms and Order, another right party, left the
Nasha Ukraina coalition.
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22 Ukraina Partiynaya chast II. “Nasha Ukraina”. In: Zerkalo nedeli no. 6 (381), 16
February 2002.
23 Ibid.
24 Yushchenko’s alliance with the independent media was mainly based on a common po-
sition criticizing the regime, but when Yushchenko passed from the opposition to the
majority, this position was not longer maintainable. In addition, the president failed to
answer some questions addressed by journalists on several scandals provoked by his
son’s lifestyle. See: Has Yushchenko Political Honeymoon Come to an End? In: Radio
Free Europe, 27 July 2005.
25 Kuzio Associates, Ukraine Strategic Insider No.1, 2006, available at http://www.
taraskuzio.net/ukraine-current/2006/StrategicInsider1.pdf, last accessed 6 Novem-
ber 2006.
26 The right movement Rukh, second party in Ukraine in the 90s, despite a split caused
by ideological reasons, had initially supported Nasha Ukraina during the 2002 elec-
tions. Of the two branches of Rukh, only the most moderate one – Rukh Kostenko –
supported Yushchenko in 2006. This is also confirmed by a sociological analysis on na-
tionalistic factors in electoral political choices in Ukraine. See Valeriy Khmelko/
Nataliya Pohorila, Osoblyvosti elektorativ osnovnykh grup partiy pered parlaments-
kymy vyboramy 1998 ta 2002 rokiv, Kiev: KIIS, available at http://www.kiis.com.ua/
index.php?id=15&sp=1&lng=eng, last accessed 9 November 2006.
IV. The 2006 Political Crisis
After defeat in the parliamentary elections, Yushchenko refused to respect the
agreement with the Orange Coalition by attempting to reappoint Yuriy Yekhanu-
rov as prime minister.27 From the beginning, Yushchenko did not discard the
idea of forming a majority with Yanukovych, conversely from his pre-election
agreements that gave priority to Tymoshenko, knowing that choosing Yanuko-
vych as PM would have been his political suicide28 at the domestic and interna-
tional levels and appointing Tymoshenko few months after dismissing her would
not ease his life. This stalemate led to a long political crisis that dragged negotia-
tions to their limit. In the end of July, Yushchenko faced a critical choice: either
propose a candidate for the prime minister post or – according to the constitu-
tion – dismiss the parliament and call for new elections, lose credibility and elec-
torate and risk being impeached.29
Between anvil and hammer, Yushchenko chose the candidate closer to him.30
In the light of the fact that in 2001 he had started negotiations with the Party of
Regions (but without Tymoshenko) for joining the Nasha Ukraina coalition, this
might have come as little surprise, despite allegations of undemocratic rule of
Viktor Yanukovych.31 Yushchenko tried to put forward his ideas once he under-
stood that Yekhanurov had no chance of becoming the new PM, by proposing a
“universal”, a joint declaration on the political direction to follow once the
prime minister would be appointed. Eventually the “universal” revealed of no
political meaning for Yanukovych. 
Once appointed, Yanukovych went on with his political program of economic
reforms and did not show any desire to consolidate ties with the European
Union and NATO, a point that was timidly mentioned in the “universal”. 
The new PM, Viktor Yanukovych, a former governor of Donetsk, is the leader
of the Party of Regions, the predominate politician in Ukraine nowadays, and
was “predestinated” to become president in 2004, after having succeeded
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27 A motion of disconfidence no confidence had already been approved by the parliament
in January 2006, this could have be a warning over the lack of popularity of Yekhanu-
rov and the strong opposition by the Party of Regions and the BIUT, which initiated
the motion.
28 Ukraine: Our Ukraine Envisions New Tymoshenko Alliance. In: Radio Free Europe,
23 March 2006.
29 Yanukovych was chosen the August 2. Should the president have failed to propose a
candidate, the parliament would have been dismissed and new elections held. This
could have led to a critical stalemate for the president.
30 Volodymyr Filenko: “If Stetskiv and I Wanted to Make it to Parliament at Any Cost, We
Would Have Joined the Presidential Party Long Time Ago”. In: Zerkalo nedeli no. 34
(562), 3 September 2005.
31 How to Understand Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. In: The Kiev Post, 15
June 2006.
Kinakh in 2002 as prime minister.32 The Party of Regions had been registered in
2001 as a union of five parties. It is currently financed by the richest man of
Ukraine, Rynat Akhmetov, who is originally from Donetsk. Akhmetov, an ally of
Yanukovych’s since the foundation of the party,33 has sat in the Verkhovna Rada
as a member of the Party of Regions since 2006.
Political crisis and instability are normally associated with an unpredictable,
and therefore healthy, political climate in which a strong opposition is able to
challenge the majority party and result in “political competition”, a prerequisite
for democracy. In this respect, Zerkalo nedeli34 remarked in 2004 that the win-
ner of the elections is known five years ahead in Turkmenistan and a year ahead
in Russia and Kazakhstan; this contrasts with the fact that the winner in Ukraine
is unknown even the day before the elections, and this was a major achievement
of Ukraine. 
The 2006 elections confirmed the democratic path of Ukraine, and the fric-
tions between the President and the prime minister in September 2006 are fur-
ther evidence of democracy.35 After his anti-NATO statement in Brussels,
Yushchenko became uncomfortable with Yanukovych as prime minister36 but is
unable to sack him, as used to happen in the past,37 and Nasha Ukraina was
obliged to join the opposition38 despite being backed by the president of
Ukraine. This is a situation unthinkable during the Kuchma era, revealing that
power in Ukraine is extremely fractioned and in the hands of a wide group of
people, not of one man; as a result, positive assessments of the country abound
in Western-oriented environments.39
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32 In the former Soviet spaces, it is common to appoint the man who is supposed to be
elected president of the country as prime minister before the elections. Kuchma was
Kravchuk’s prime minister and Putin was prime minister of Russia before becoming its
president.
33 Pyat’ istochnikov, pyat’ sostavnykh chastey bloka “Za Edinyu Ukrainu!”. In: Zerkalo
nedeli no. 10 (385), 23 March 2002.
34 O natsionalnoy gordosti malorossov. In: Zerkalo nedeli no. 44 (519), 30 October
2004.
35 Dva Viktora, odna viktoria. In: Korrespondent no. 37 (226), 23 September 2006.
36 Ukraine: Pro Presidential Bloc go into Opposition. In: Radio Free Europe, 19 October
2006.
37 In November 2002 president Kuchma replaced both the prime minister Minister
(Viktor Yanukovych for Anatoliy Kinakh) and the minister of foreign affairs in three
days, in order to present his own position at the NATO summit of 21–22 November.
See Ukraine: Kuchma Appoints New, Loyal prime minister, Insists on Coming to NA-
TO Summit. In: Radio Free Europe, 18 November 2002.
38 Ukraine: Pro-Presidential Bloc Goes into Opposition. In: Radio Free Europe, 19
October 2006.
39 For instance Freedom House, in its report on Freedom in the World, classifies Ukraine
as “free” for the first time in 2005. See also Ukrainian Elections Free and Fair,
Consolidating Democratic Breakthrough. In: OSCE Press Release, 27 March 2006. 
V. The People Have the Elections They Deserve: the “Party of Power” 
and Opposition after Independence
In this section we shall propose the idea that development of opposition move-
ments in Ukraine led to strengthening of de facto political pluralism, and not on-
ly de jure pluralism like in other CIS republics. At the end of the nineties an op-
position was not only present, but operating at the political level. This, together
with the development of civic society, allowed a sort of limitation of presidential
power that eventually resulted in a division of power between the president and
the parliament, thus fostering the process of democratization in the country.
To understand the relevance of the 2006 elections, we shall do a step back-
wards and compare their outcome with those of the previous elections (see
Tables 7 and 8). Ukraine in 1991 was only one of the fifteen republics born from
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which, notably, had maintained a one-party
system since the October Revolution. Nevertheless, participation in politics in
Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990s was relatively high for a Soviet country,
second only to activism in the Baltic Republics. 
Rukh, the “political movement for the support of perestroika”, was one of the
main actors in Ukrainian independence, actively participating in the 1990 elec-
toral campaign and joining, together with other forces including the Green Party,
in the victory of the “democratic bloc” in Lviv, Ivano- Frankivsk and Ternopil
constituencies, and allowing the opposition to get 125 seats in the Verkhovna
Rada.40
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40 Ukraina Partiynaya chast II. “Nasha Ukraina”. In: Zerkalo nedeli no. 6 (381), 16
February 2002 and Ukraina Partiynaya Chast I. Partya zelenykh. In: Zerkalo nedeli no.
5 (380), 9 February 2002.
Table 7: Typology of the opposition in the presidential elections in 1991
Candidates Results
Kravchuk (center-left) 61.59 %
Chornovil (right) 23.27 %
Luk’yanenko (right) 4.49 %
Hryn’ov (right) 4.17 %
Yukhnovs’kyi (center) 1.74 %
Taburyans’kyi (ill-defined) 0.57 %
Source: Sarah Birch/Gwendolyn Sasse, The Presidential Election in Ukraine. In: The
Presidential Election and the Implication for Europe. Briefing Note 1/99, Sussex European
Institute, October 1999.
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41 In 1989 and 1991 workers of the Donbas region went on strike against the poor work-
ing conditions and economic benefits; in 1990 some 150 students occupied the centre
of Kiev and started a hunger strike to demand prime minister Vitaly Masol’s resigna-
tion and nationalization of the CP properties. For more information see: Orest Dolnyi,
Studencheska revolutsiya na granite, Kiev 1996.
42 This was also the result of an electoral law favoring parties winning in most populated
regions: only 50 % of the seats were assigned on a proportional basis, where the rest
were allocated on a system of absolute preferences, meaning that the most voted par-
ties at national level received more seats, and therefore favoring those parties enjoying
support in the more populated east.
43 Those relatively low results depend on an electoral law allowing a candidate to run for
a post in the parliament without any party affiliation. Until 2006 elections some local
candidates, able to secure some local votes, succeeded in entering the parliament on
the basis of their prestige in an electoral district area. In addition, elected candidates
were free to change their political affiliation, passing to another party in the course of
Table 8: Typology of the opposition at the presidential elections in 1994
Candidate 1st Round 2nd Round
Kravchuk (center-right) 37.72 % 45.06 %
Kuchma (center-left) 31.27 % 52.14 %
Moroz (left) 13.04 %
Lanovyi (center) 9.32 %
Babych (center) 2.39 %
Plyushch (center) 1.29 %
Talanchuk (center) 0.54 %
Source: Sarah Birch/Gwendolyn Sasse, The Presidential Election in Ukraine. In: The
Presidential Election and the Implication for Europe. Briefing Note 1/99, Sussex European
Institute, October 1999.
VI. Opposition Movements
Further to political pressures and civic mobilization initiated by students and
continued by workers,41 a referendum on independence from the USSR resulted
in more than 90 % of the country in favor. In the first presidential elections the
head of the Verkhovna Rada in 1990 and 1991, Leonid Kravchuk, became the
first elected president of Ukraine with 38.32 % of preferences, immediately fol-
lowed by the Rukh leader Volodymyr Chornovil with 23.27 %, confirming Rukh
as a major force in the country. 
The party went to the 1994 elections with a target of at least 100 seats. In
spite of its relative low score of around 30 seats,42 it affirmed itself as the second
main force in the country with 5.15 % in 1994 and 9.40 % in 1998; the Commu-
nists scored 12.72 % and 24.65 %.43
The parliament enjoyed relatively little power in the 1990s but succeeded in
defending its autonomy from the attacks to make it compliant,44 though high re-
gional polarization resulted in a divided and weak opposition,45 as well as presi-
dential power increasing as a result of political games and contrasts.46
A stronger opposition emerged at the end of the decade, not as a movement
opposing the president, but as an alliance of forces proposing an alternative ide-
ology and opposing constructively the majority, as Yushchenko stated.47
Difficulties in organizing an opposition were created by the political climate
of the 1990s. When a politician joined the opposition, kompromat was called up-
on, like in the case of Lazarenko or Tymoshenko; when an opponent became a
risk for the “political stability” of the country more extreme measures were tak-
en, like the mysterious death of Chernovil48 or the alleged poisoning of
Yushchenko.49 The same fate was set for those trying to investigate corruption in
the higher spheres of politics, the saddest and most famous being the murder of
the journalist Heorgyi Gongadze. But physical elimination of journalists was the
norm in the 1990s, as the International Press Institute reports at least 18 of them
died in mysterious circumstances between 1991 and 2001.50
Rukh, inheriting the ideology of the nationalists opposing Soviet rule in
Ukraine,51 was the untamable party of the 1990s. It was nationalistic and very
keen on nation building, according to Shevel’s classification.52 Rukh openly
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their mandate so that lawmakers – and often their individual needs – became more im-
portant than their ideological background.
44 Sarah Whitmore, State and Institution Building Under Kuchma. In: Problems of Post-
Communism, 52 (2005) 5, p. 3–11, here 8.
45 Cf. Taras Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma, New York 1997.
46 Ukraina partiynaya Chast V. Sotsialisticheskaya partya Ukrainy. In: Zerkalo nedeli no.
9 (383), 8 March 2002.
47 Ukraina Partiynaya chast II. “Nasha Ukraina”. In: Zerkalo nedeli no. 6 (381), 16
February 2002.
48 Volodymyr Chornovil, leader of the party Rukh, died as a result of a fatal car accident
few months before the 1999 presidential elections. Although formal investigations de-
nied it, part of the opposition believes this was a political murder. See Roman Worono-
wycz, Rumors of Conspiracy Inflamed by Lack of Criminal Investigation into Fatal
Collision. In: The Ukrainian Weekly, 4 April 1999; Vadym Ryzhkov, Tragedy: KamAZ
Truck Driver Fears Retribution. In: The Day, 27 April 1999.
49 Viktor Yushchenko suffered from food poisoning in September 2004 on the eve of the
presidential elections to which he was the favorite candidate. The investigations are
still ongoing but in 2004 the government dismissed any accusation of poisoning and
concluded Yushchenko had suffered from “normal” food poisoning. See Yushchenko
and the Poisoning Theory. In: BBC Online, 11 December 2004. See also Temnik pro
khvoroby Yushchenka. In: Ukrainska Pravda, 1 October 2004.
50 IPI Death Watch, http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/deathwatch.html, last accessed
20 October 2006.
51 For a panorama on the nationalistic movements in the soviet period see Dina Zisser-
man-Brodsky, Constructing Ethnopolitics in the Soviet Union: Samizdat, Deprivation,
and the Rise of Ethnic Nationalism, Basingstoke/New York 2003.
52 Oxana Shevel distinguishes nationalistic and non nationalistic parties according to the
priority of nation building on their agenda. All parties were nationalist in theory, but
named Kuchma an “enemy of Ukraine” and supported Leonid Kravchuk in the
run off against Kuchma, and it played a role in proposing Ukrainian national
symbols in the 1996 constitution, further consolidating a nation building project
that boosted Ukrainian identity in the 1990s.53 In Ukraine Russian is not the na-
tional language and double citizenship was rejected to limit Russian influence.
The main nationalistic achievements were one state language, Ukrainian nation-
al symbols, and Russians remaining as a national minority, despite accounting
for more than 20 percent according to the 1989 census; the price to pay was
more power to the president and Crimean autonomy.54
The story of the Ukrainian political opposition diverges from any other CIS
country. In contrast with most of the former USSR (excluding the Baltic
Republics), an opposition not only developed in the 1990s (albeit slowly) in
Ukraine, but became able to legally operate, influence public opinion and influ-
ence the political life of the country.55 It is true that the idea of a “Party of
Power” was present in Ukraine,56 and even Nasha Ukraina in 2002 patiently
accepted forming an opposition, despite receiving the most votes of any party in
the country. It was also true that Kuchma, through the Presidential
Administration, was able, through temniki,57 to influence the media coverage
from his 1999 presidential campaign on, dismiss opposition leaders, and ensure
that no forces emerged to counter him. Despite claims of a lack of democracy,
complete control of power, as occurred elsewhere, was absent, and change was
around the corner: as soon as Kuchma went too far a political storm started. In
this respect the 2000 political crisis and the Kuchmagate were the visible results
of a development of the opposition. The very fact that information on the coun-
try was disseminated was already a success for Ukraine, and some seeds of dem-
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only few acted as such. See Oxana Shevel, Nationality in Ukraine: Some Rules of
Engagement. In: East European Politics and Society, 16 (2002) 2, p. 386–413.
53 Ibid.
54 For a detailed description of the constitutional negotiations see Katarzyna Wolczuk,
The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation, Budapest
2001.
55 Roman Solchanyk reports that out of the 36 votes against the new constitution of
1996, 35 came from communist and socialist deputies, thing that confirm the tenden-
cy in the CIS seeing the nationalistic party as more progressive than the leftist ones.
See Roman Solchanyk, The Radical Right in Ukraine. In: Sabrina Ramet (ed.), The
Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, Penn State 1999, p.
279–296, here 285.
56 Paul Gobe, The East: Analysis from Washington – the Coming End of the Party of
Power. In: Radio Free Europe, 9 June 1999.
57 Literally little darks, this way are called the instructions on what to broadcast and what
to avoid “for the good of the country” handed to newspaper and TV channel directors
in order to exert a control on the media.
ocratic attitude, both in politics58 and people,59 were already planted in the
1990s. 
Oleksandr Moroz, a leader of the progressive Socialist Party and parliament
speaker from 1994 to 1998, was the first politician to openly challenge president
Kuchma; he first ran as a candidate for the presidential elections in 1999 and
then was the promoter of the tape scandal in 200060 and of the Kuchmagate
movement.61 This, together with the rise of Yushchenko as an opposition leader
and the creation of a Forum for National Salvation – a political organization op-
posing president Kuchma – by Yuliya Tymoshenko, strongly impacted the presi-
dent’s popularity, which decreased to below 10 % for the first time on the
evening of the 2004 presidential elections. The opposition had succeeded, and
the Kuchma entourage was seeing the end of its rule. The last card Kuchma
played was to position himself as the pacificator between two of his “sons”,
Yanukovych and Yushchenko, but this eventually failed.
VII. Presidential Power
Another important factor influenced Ukrainian politics in 2000. Since the 1991
strikes, participation of citizens in politicals was low and no contest of the cur-
rent government was held. After 2000, an ever increasing number of people be-
came active in political life and challenged the president through street rallies,
which became an increasingly common modus operandi in the country, although
these proved decisive only in 2004. The political mistakes of President Kuchma
resulted in a political transformation of the electorate (Table 9) and were the ba-
sis for the Kuchmagate movement, and the active civic movements “Vstavay
Ukraina!” and “Ukraine without Kuchma” could count on increasing popular
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58 Michael McFaul, Importing Revolution: Internal and External Factors in Ukraine’s
2004 Democratic Breakthrough. In: CDDRL Working Papers no. 59, May 2006.
Available at http://cddrl.stanford.edu, last accessed 20 October 2006.
59 Cf. Abel Polese, Ukraine: The Future is Orange? In: Transitions on-Line, 28 Novem-
ber 2004.
60 Mykola Melnychenko, a bodyguard of President Kuchma who is now a refugee in the
USA, recorded hours of the president’s phone conversations, including the orders to
kill opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze. The process is still ongoing, as Kuchma
always refused to acknowledge his voice in the tapes and, given the unofficial immuni-
ty granted by president Yushchenko, Ukraine has not the necessary technology to
prove that Kuchma’ voice is the one recorded. In 2006 the Court of Human Rights
Court in Strasburg condemned Ukraine to a payment of several millions of dollars to
the Gongadze widow, now working in the USA, for failing to solve the case.
61 Further to the Gongadze scandal, some politicians mobilized people and organized a
partisan movement against the president. In the frame of the Kuchmagate, street
protests and the movement stand up Ukraine (Vstavay Ukraina) gave birth to massive
mobilization of civic society in the country, opening the way to the massive 2004
protests.
support from 2000 until 2003. From 2004 on, civic activism became not only
stronger but also more organized and started interacting with politicians and the
intelligentsia. “Kuchmizm” (from president Kuchma) became an official term to
define a corrupt and authoritarian attitude of the political class. Not surprising-
ly, the first action of the organization PORA (it’s time) would be to increase
awareness of Kuchmizm in Ukraine.62
Training for NGO leaders, structuring of the civic opposition, increasing po-
litical participation and popular discontent led to the coordination of dozens of
NGOs in protesting against falsification of election results in 2004, and a mas-
sive popular support that changed the country, if not politically, then at least so-
cially: “Ukrainians might not change the elections, but the elections have
changed the Ukrainians.”63
The president’s arrogant attitude, backed by the main Ukrainian clans, be-
came increasingly balanced by an opposition able to legitimize its position
through massive popular support and able to organize massive mobilization in
November 2004 and reverse the fortunes of the country.
This was not an easy task: Kuchma could count on the Kiev clan, with Viktor
Medvedchuk, head of the presidential administration and leader of the Social
Democratic Party; the Donetsk clan, financially backed by Rynat Akhmetov; and
the Dnepropetrovsk clan, with the head of the Party of Labor Viktor Pinchuk
who, following a traditional strategy, consolidated his relationship with the pres-
ident by marrying his daughter. 
Additionally, Kuchma could count on the Agrarian Party (Volodymyr Lytvyn),
the National Democratic Party, and Solidarity – at least until Petro Poroshenko
switched to the opposition. Competition among one another secured Kuchma’s
role of supreme leader and mediator of the power game of Ukrainian politics.
Despite this, and the political elimination of some contenders, the opposition
grew stronger: Tymoshenko’s creation of a solid electoral bloc (Yuliya Tymo-
shenko Bloc, BIUT) and Moroz’s decision to participate in the mobilization for
“Ukraine without Kuchma” were sided by the second political force of the coun-
try, the Rukh. 
Despite the death of Rukh chairman and the split of the party, new forces
emerged and some of the main business leaders of the country converted into
figures of the opposition. An example is Poroshenko, who entered the bloc
Nasha Ukraine in 2002, refreshed the opposition’s forces and had an effect on
the democratic – but still unnoticed – transformation of the country.
According to Aslund, there was a serious impact from the – often US fi-
nanced – independent media,64 which was able to inform the external world on
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62 Case Study on the Civic Campaign PORA, available at www.pora.org.ua, last accessed
15 June 2006.
63 Polese, Ukraine: The Future is Orange?
64 Michael McFaul, Importing Revolution: Internal and External Factors in Ukraine’s
2004 Democratic Breakthrough. In: CDDRL Working Papers no. 59 May 2006.
Available at http://cddrl.stanford.edu, last accessed 20 October 2006.
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Table 9: Distribution of the electorate by orientation, age and education in 1998
and 2001
Social demographic features
1998
Electorate in 1998
Left Center-left Center-right Right 
N = 310 N = 170 N = 247 N = 212
Men 47 40 49 56
Women 53 60 51 44
Total 100 100 100 100
18–29 7 13 25 16
30–44 18 21 31 32
45–59 32 27 22 25
> 59 43 38 22 28
Total 100 100 100 100
Lower than high school 28 20 12 25
High school education 30 35 27 30
Specialist education 28 24 32 28
University 15 21 29 17
Total 100 100 100 100
Social demographic features 2001
Electorate in 2001
N = 270 N = 86 N = 370 N =299
Men 45 50 45 50
Women 55 50 55 50
Total 100 100 100 100
18–29 8 20 35 21
30–44 20 34 26 29
45–59 24 30 23 24
> 59 48 16 16 26
Total 100 100 100 100
Education
Lower than high school 34 11 12 21
High school education 26 37 32 30
Specialist education 28 21 30 22
University 12 31 26 27
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Valeriy Khmelko/Nataliya Pohorila, Osoblivosti elektorativ osnovnykh grup partiy
pered parlamentskymy vyboramy 1998 ta 2002 rokiv, www.kiis.com.ua, last accessed 9 No-
vember 2006.
political developments in Ukraine and therefore lobby at international level
against president Kuchma. Thus, in Ukraine there was a unique situation: an au-
thoritarian regime and “elective democracy” accompanied by a strong repres-
sion of media and a despotic rule of the president, but combined with the fact
that the international community was aware of it and willing to pressure the
president to release control on media and civic society, and local population was
somehow, and to a decent extent, informed. Together with the possibility for the
opposition to legally contrast the presidential power – at least to a certain degree
– this made Ukraine a green oasis if compared with politics in Russia, Belarus or
Turkmenistan. 
It was extremely important, even more than the grasp that in Ukraine there
was “little democracy”, that the international community and the Ukrainian peo-
ple knew in detail what was happening on the political scene of the country.65
The opposition in Ukraine included –to some extent- the Communists, who
often served Kuchma’s interests but were also ready to challenge him by partici-
pating in the anti-Kuchma demonstrations occurring since 2000 or adopting an
anarchic attitude in 2004: neither Yanukovych nor Yushchenko.66 However, the
main figure of the opposition rapidly became Viktor Yushchenko. Still Kuchma’s
main pawn, Yushchenko was appointed prime minister in 1999 to boost the
Ukrainian economy – which was in deep stagnation at that time – and increase
Kuchma’s popularity; for the first time, Ukrainian economy registered real
growth – not less than 5 % – but then the Yushchenko cabinet was judged too re-
formist by a majority of oligarchs and dismissed in 2001. 
VIII. The Turning Point
The disagreement between the president and his people reached its peak on the
eve of the 2004 presidential elections. Following the strategy of some neighbor
countries like Belarus and Russia, the president self-proclaimed his continuing
rule in Ukraine. After holding a referendum on whether he could run for a third
term – resulting in a massive approval from the population, and the results of
which the Council of Europe refused to acknowledge – he convinced the
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65 The Gongadze scandal was of international concern and contributed, together with
the Kolchuga case – where military radar was illegally sold to Iran – to deprive Kuch-
ma of any respect at international level. Ukraine was invited to the 2002 NATO sum-
mit in Prague, but somebody other than Kuchma was expected to attend. And at the
national level, the 2000 protests in Ukraine were the most massive since the 1991
strikes. 
66 This strong position contributed to further alienate the Communist Party from ongoing
politics and its electorate: the 2006 election results are evidence of this.
Constitutional Court in December 2001 that he was entitled to run for a third
term.67
Despite this, Kuchma’s position was weak: not only was the Council of
Europe threatening to exclude Ukraine because of the above referendum and
the country’s failure to end the death penalty, but the international community
felt they had little to share with the president – as evidenced by the NATO sum-
mit of 2002.68 Furthermore, the people of Ukraine saw no reason for a Kuchma
third term, as shown by the meager 8 % of Ukrainians ready to vote for Kuchma
a third time.69 New forces were emerging and replacing those loyal to the presi-
dent, and this will be shown in the 2006 elections, when most characters of the
ancient regime failed to enter the parliament.70
Kuchma’s strategy was to designate his potential successor in 2002 and ap-
point Viktor Yanukovych as prime minister.71 He balanced Yushchenko’s popu-
larity in the west with a man extremely popular in the east72 and further polar-
ized the country, leading to the east-west division so notorious during the 2004
elections, and thus tried to position himself as mediator of the forces73 and gain
in popularity. The unexpected response of the population prompted Kuchma to
barter immunity for a dignified political retirement, and the role of mediator was
played by Volodymyr Lytvyn instead. 
A voice in this change was the socialist Moroz, who slowly increased his pop-
ularity, and Yuliya Tymoshenko, a giant in the Ukrainian political scene and a
charismatic popular leader. This is clear from the leap forward her party regis-
tered at the polls, from 7.26 % of the vote in 2002 to 22.29 % in 2006. Hence, it
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67 Ukraine’s “Velvet Revolution”: Transition to the post Kuchma era. In: The Ukrainian
Weekly, September 22 2002; Ukraine: Exploring Kuchma’s Motives for Moving
Toward Parliamentary Democracy. In: Radio Free Europe, 29 August 2002. 
68 As a prize for the continued cooperation with NATO – the Partnership for Peace
agreement signed in 1996 and the Ukrainian engagement in Kosovo and then in
Bosnia – Ukraine was invited to the 2002 summit, while the Belarusian president was
even denied a visa to attend the meeting. Kuchma’s reputation, already undermined by
the Gongadze scandal, was definitely ruined by the Kolchuga case – when the presi-
dent was accused to have sold radar to Iran – so that he was not expected to attend the
meeting. He had the time, however, to dismiss the current foreign minister to send a
more trustworthy man to the meeting to accompany him and this resulted in little talks
between Ukraine and NATO at the 2002 Prague summit. 
69 Will political reform lead Ukraine out of its crisis? In: The Ukrainian Weekly, 23
March 2003.
70 Lytvyn’s electoral campaign is a clear example of his political transformation: after hav-
ing proposed himself as mediator between Yushchenko and Yanukovych in 2004,
Lytvyn’s TV advertisement showed two opposed forces, orange and blue, and a media-
tor – green, the color of relaxation, able to conciliate them but, at the same time, re-
vealing incapable to propose anything new.
71 In Ukraine, as in other CIS countries, there is a tacit understanding that the designat-
ed prime minister before the election will also be the successor of the president.
72 Yanukovych is the former governor of the Donetskaya oblast and is extremely popular
in the Donbas region.
73 Obyknovennyi kuchmizm. In: Ukrainska Pravda, 11 August 2006.
came as no surprise that the opposition was able to organize massive protests to
oppose the electoral fraud of November 2004 and that people were willing to
arise in the hope of a better life. The result of those synergies was a constitution-
al reform in November 2004, which had been debated in the parliament since
the end of the 1990s. The possibility of a political reform was a way to overcome
the increasingly frequent political crises; in this regard the reform of 2004 was of
utmost importance to the adoption of a democratic reform discussed in the next
section. 
IX. Democratic Oriented Reforms and Soviet Political Culture in the 
New Millennium: Main Achievements 
In this section we intend to show that despite political and social synergies result-
ing in democratic achievements, they have happened in Ukraine by chance; that
is to say they are rather the result of political arm wrestling than a defined strat-
egy of some political elites. 
Although the West is ready to give credits to Yushchenko for his democratic
achievements, it must be acknowledged that the adoption of a constitution, in-
cluding the long preparation process, happened thanks to president Kuchma
and was the only way for the country to survive. The constitution posed an an-
swer to the question of Crimean separatism and cooled nationalistic pretensions
by allowing Ukrainian national symbols to be mentioned in the constitution and
Ukrainian as sole state language. This led scholars to define it not only as the ut-
most instrument of nation-building of the Kuchma presidency,74 but the basis for
democratic consolidation of Ukraine since it granted the Ukrainian parliament
some power, a unique case, together with Moldova, in the strongly presidential
CIS countries.
The practice, however, was different, as evidenced by the creation of the
Presidential Administration. While not mentioned in the constitution, the
Presidential Administration had grown by 2004 from a small executive organ in-
to the most powerful ally of President Kuchma, able to prevent any political par-
ty or politician from growing strong enough to challenge the president.75 This sit-
uation allowed immunity for civil servants of the Presidential Administration
before the constitutional court, despite their extremely influential role in the
country. 
The Presidential Administration was capable of influencing mass media –
temniki sent to TV channels, illegal “tax inspections” for publishers showing too
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much audacity, or even murder, and the Gongadze one is only the most famous,
not the sole one. The Presidential Administration also influenced the career of
several politicians (dismissing of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko in 2001 from PM
and deputy PM posts, and the Lazarenko scandal), or even threatened lives –
there were allegations of implication in Chornovil’s, Kypr’s, and other politi-
cians’ deaths, and in the Yushchenko poisoning. In practice, the Presidential
Administration was a state within the state.76
Seeds of democracy were already present in the 1990s, and the ever increas-
ing work of the Parliament shown by Whitmore is a visible sign; 752 laws were
passed from 1994 to 1998, 1.131 from 1998 to 2002, and the trend continued
upward from 2002 to 2006.77 However, the turning points were the constitu-
tional reform of 2004 and the liquidation – or better, the renaming and redefin-
ition of its functions – of the Presidential Administration in 2005, which reduced
the risk of power abuse in the future. 
The constitutional reform, which took effect during the Yushchenko presiden-
cy, was not proposed by Yushchenko, but was the only way to get through the po-
litical crisis of November 2004 when, further to mass protests against falsifica-
tion of the presidential elections, candidates Yushchenko and Yanukovych were
supposed to negotiate, but each stubbornly kept his position. To tackle the issue,
the proposition was to split power between the president and the prime minis-
ter:78 full powers would be given to the president but only until the next parlia-
mentary elections, after which Ukraine would become a parliamentary republic
with a division of power between the president and the cabinet of ministers. 
This de facto granted Yushchenko full powers – so that Viktor Andreevich
was happy, but for a limited period of time, and so that Viktor Fedorovich was
satisfied as well – as the prime minister would become more important than the
president soon after. It came as no surprise, hence, that Yushchenko addressed
the constitutional reform adopted in 2004 as illegitimate – terms that he uses
every time he does not like the outcome of a political negotiation, like when
Moroz was elected speaker in July 2006 or when Yuri Ekhanurov was dismissed
in January 2006 – and tried to subordinate the reform to a popular referendum.
If Ukraine has now a division of powers appropriate for a democratic state, it is
not because of Yushchenko’s reforms, but only thanks to the response of the po-
litical class to a situation of crisis. The package of reforms adopted in 2004 in-
cluded an important point of the electoral law. A regional balance was ensured
by liquidating the system of absolute preferences, and thus rewarding the parties
with the most votes, regardless of whether the votes came from only a few re-
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gions or were collected throughout the country; this allowed regional polariza-
tion of politics,79 since a party securing massive support in a single district could
be better rewarded than a party supported all over the country but moderately. 
A second important point is party affiliation. Elected deputies are not allowed
to change party affiliation nor run as independent candidates; that is, party affil-
iation became obligatory and immutable, so citizens are directed towards an ide-
ological choice and can be sure that a candidate militating in a party shares the
party ideology. An element of confusion in previous elections was the “who was
who” phenomenon: once the deputies were elected, their real political orienta-
tion was clear only after the first sessions of the parliament and, having to an-
swer to no one, they were allowed to follow their own interests instead of those
of their constituency.
Pressure on the media had been increasing in Ukraine, particularly since
1999, when president Kuchma felt seriously challenged80 for the first time. This
pressure peaked during the 2004 electoral campaign: Kanal 5 saw its license
suspended – until a hunger strike forced the government to step back – and then
its broadcasting hindered, while other channels were under pressure to “filter”
information so not to endanger “national security”, and thus manipulation of
press was the order of the day. 
Pressure on civic movements was also high and aimed at keeping people out
of politics. The most active civic movement in 2004, the organization PORA,
was accused of terrorism and false evidence was produce to discredit it to the
public.81 However, the ever-increasing oppression of the people had the oppo-
site result. In November 2004 journalists publicly announced that they had been
the target of Presidential Administration threats, and they signed a declaration
obligating them to report only true and impartial information. Meanwhile, the
Ukrainian people lost their fear and stood up in mass to express their opinions,
regardless of whether this was favorable to the government. 
Massive mobilization of people and journalist disobedience happened during
the Orange Revolution, but their origins are to be found much earlier, as they
are historically rooted in the Ukrainian people and were helped by the mild atti-
tude of president Kuchma. Despite repressing the media and ruling according to
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semi-authoritarian principles, Kuchma never reached the level of political
repression found in other CIS countries, eased exchanges between Ukraine and
the West, and was much more permissive than, for instance, president Luka-
shenko with regards to cooperation with foreign actors, whether economic, po-
litical or social. 
In a sense, Kuchma was much less ideological than Lukashenko and much
more interested in trying to get support in the East and in the West to secure self
preservation,82 and therefore produced no relevant results.83 He was ready to
support economic reforms (as long as they did not affect his personal networks),
EU integration, and an increase in the “Europeanness” of Ukraine (as long as
this did not prompt him to go against his interests). While Belarusian political
discourse explicitly refused NATO and EU cooperation always preferring Rus-
sia, Ukraine was playing a role in between, accepting EU influence (Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement, Common Strategy), cooperating with NATO (Part-
nership for Peace, Kosovo Mission, Bosnia and Herzegovina Police Mission) but
only as long as this did not irritate Moscow too much.84
X. Challenges
Democracy means the legitimization of political parties present in the parlia-
ment by a strong connection with the electorate, and this is now a main chal-
lenge in Ukraine. D’Anieri questions the capability of political parties to become
mass-based political parties: not based on a single individual but rather on an
ideology.85
Another point is the de facto separation of the judicial power from the execu-
tive branch. Since independence, courts served the interest of businessmen and
politicians, rather than being an institution at the service of the citizen and this
often influenced the outcome of their decision, like when in 2001 Kuchma was
allowed by the Constitutional Court to run for a third term. Although the issue
has been raised, doubts on the impartiality of Ukrainian main courts may arise
and are a serious hinder to further reforms.86
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A final point, and the main one in the light of the 2006 political crisis, is the
attitude of political elites towards the people. The expression “electoral democ-
racy” well describes those former Soviet countries where political elites and peo-
ple conduct independent lives and meet only when elections are approaching;
that is, people have little or no voice in the political decisions of the country.
Once politicians are elected by the people, it is understood all that they will do is
“the right thing” and the people have no reason to complain; in other words,
“the party is taking care of its citizens”, as one could hear on the radio after the
Chernobyl.87 We can define this attitude as “Soviet political culture”, and one
must admit that little has changed in this direction. 
Despite that Yushchenko may have been formed in a more Western environ-
ment, one has to acknowledge his limits and the limits of democracy in Ukraine,
as well as the fact that radical political change has happened neither as a result of
the 2004 presidential elections, nor as a result of the 2006 parliamentary elec-
tions. 
Yushchenko and Yanukovych come from the same “political school”, which is
to say they grew up politically under Kuchma and have much in common.88 As
Volodymyr Filenko, a member of the Reforms and Order Party, remarked:
“Yushchenko is a very democratic and absolutely normal man. He wants to build
a civilized system of government, but he grew up in the old system [...] [H]e had
a moment of choice between what he did not know and so was intimidating, and
what was known and predictable to him. He chose the latter [...] I can only judge
from his entourage, where I cannot see a single person without the ‘Kuchma
background’. And the president sees a lot of things through the eyes of these
people”.89 Ukrainska Pravda reported that “Both Yushchenko and Yanukovych
have a very biased idea of what is the best for their people. Yushchenko thinks
that the best for Ukraine is EU integration and NATO accession and Yanukovych
thinks of the economic reform as the maximum benefit for Ukrainians [...] and
both will follow their idea regardless of the real needs of the Ukrainians”.90
At this stage, past political events have fed the impression that the govern-
ment is likely to pursue its goals regardless, or even, against the opinion of the
citizens, and Table 10 shows one of the effects, which is lack of trust in institu-
tions and mass media, impacting political and participation of citizens.
It must be said that Yushchenko has brought some changes to the country. A
modest attempt to battle corruption has been made; some 4,500 of the myriad of
regulations to register a business have been annulled, reducing the opportunities
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Table 10: Youngsters’(16–34) level of trust in institutions in three CIS countries
Mass media
Ukraine Russia Azerbaijan
Fully trust 10.40 % 7.00 % 19.60 %
Strongly trust 57.00 % 59.80 % 52.40 %
Lack of trust 19.70 % 25.90 % 18.60 %
Political Parties
Ukraine Russia Azerbaijan
Fully trust 1.20 % 1.50 % 6.20 %
Strongly trust 11.00 % 13.30 % 31.00 %
Lack of trust 48.80 % 51.00 % 29.60 %
Parliament
Ukraine Russia Azerbaijan
Fully trust 1.50 % 4.20 % 6.80 %
Strongly trust 17.30 % 25.50 % 24.20 %
Lack of trust 38.00 % 40.50 % 31.00 %
Courts
Ukraine Russia Azerbaijan
Fully trust 7.50 % 6.20 % 9.40 %
Strongly trust 30.10 % 40.90 % 30.80 %
Lack of trust 33.50 % 33.60 % 25.80 %
Source: Rezultaty porivnyalnogo mizhnarodnogo doslidzhennya ‘suchasne I maybutne
tr’okh klyuchovykh postradyanskykh krain (Azerbaidzhan, Rosiya, Ukraina). Poglyad molo-
dykh’, www.kiis.com.ua, last accessed 9 November 2006.
for corruption in public offices.91 We must also acknowledge that the practice of
“tax inspections” for those business or media not enjoying the sympathy of the
regime are disappearing; but the case of PORA, who was prevented from regis-
tering as a political party to run for the 2005 elections, might also raise some
doubts on the Yushchenko’s full commitment to democratic change.92
Yushchenko certainly deserves credit for to having held the fairest elections in
Ukraine since independence. But to what extent is his attitude towards democra-
cy due to a firm ideology, and to what extent is it the result of chance? While ac-
cepting credit for the elections, Yushchenko was unwilling to accept their results;
he demanded a recount, and then dragged negotiations for a coalition to the
maximum period allowed by the constitution; furthermore, he did not respect
pre-election agreements with Moroz and Tymoshenko.93 He was willing to use
the threat of new elections to maximum the outcome for himself and Nasha
Ukraina; and when Moroz’s election as speaker of the parliament risked ruining
his plans, he called for illegitimacy of this action. His honeymoon with the media
was based on a tacit agreement, according to which both (Yushchenko and the
media) wanted to criticize the ancient regime. But when it came to a construc-
tive dialogue, he refused to take his responsibilities for the reckless life of his son
and alleged that newspapers attacks were politically motivated. 
Yushchenko, hence, was primarily interested in his political survival rather
than bringing definitive changes to Ukraine as he declared in 2005,94 and,
though his attitude is not comparable with previous Ukrainian elites, it seems
that to a certain extent democracy was his marketing strategy rather than his ide-
ological aim. It is certainly true that Yushchenko, especially if compared with the
former presidents, was less authoritative and much more sensitive to public
opinion and to pressures of the international community, but the democratic
changes in Ukraine were only marginally the fruit of his work; more often, this
was the result of a negotiation between leading forces unable to find a common
point and obliged to come to a compromise, which is proper of a democratic
country. After all, in a Machiavellian perspective, the past actions, though doubt-
fully democratic, have led to the fact that it appears improbable, nowadays, that
anybody in the future will be attempting to return to fully authoritarian rule; not
because hunger of power is absent, but because institutional and social changes
have some permanent features. Power fragmentation would not allow a single
man to run the country, and the current political instability is evidence of this.
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XI. Conclusions: Perspectives of Further Democratization
Since recent democratic achievements in Ukraine are not linked to the attitude
of a single politician but are the result of political compromises and slow im-
provements since 1991, the developments of the 2006 elections, which have in-
spired some fears in the country over the re-election of Viktor Yanukovych as
prime minister, do not seem to represent an obstacle to democracy for Ukraine.
Conversely, they have shown a balance of power with several political parties en-
gaging in a stiff competition, a fact that is proper of healthy political environ-
ments. Regional polarization is still strongly present in Ukraine,95 impacting the
political choices of Ukrainians and, to a certain extent, the power balance in the
government. Nevertheless, as a result of the – short – political history of the
country after independence, it seems that a point-of-no-return has been reached. 
Two points have to be considered. The first is that despite being feared for its
authoritative manners, it is unlikely that Yanukovych will maintain the same ful-
ly authoritarian attitude he had under Kuchma: key people like Medvedchuk are
now – temporarily – out of the main scene of politics, and even if they come back
they will have to rethink a strategy more proper to the new rules of the game; civ-
il society in Ukraine is stronger than before and the attention of the internation-
al community is more likely to limit the spectrum of choice of any future political
leader.
The second is that the current division of power in Ukraine is proper of dem-
ocratic states, where it is impossible for a single political force to control the to-
tality of the country. Presidential power is now shared and balanced by a
stronger parliament, and even the majority has a limited spectrum of actions
since it is balanced by a strong opposition. Democracy in Ukraine has improved,
and the Freedom House classification as “free”96 is a further confirmation.
However, this is not the result of a team working on democracy, but rather it was
the only way to allow the country to survive politically and economically and
again the result of chance: the lack of an authoritarian leader rising up in a mo-
ment of economic and political instability, an element that Sharp mentions as a
prerequisite in the transition from an authoritarian regime into a democratic
one.97
On the one hand, a democratic political culture has to be improved, on the
other, it is extremely relevant that democracy is not likened to the charisma of a
single man, but is more embedded in the society and is, therefore, sustainable. In
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spite of Yushchenko’s frequent labeling as the first democratic president, the cur-
rent state of affairs allows for further democratic improvements should the pres-
ident not be confirmed for a second term. In addition, the growing role of the
public opinion and independent media, the monitoring of the international com-
munity and the ever increasing role of civic NGOs has led to an extremely safe
political environment; although some parties have not yet ridden themselves of
the infantile sickness of leftism (or rightism) and shelter themselves behind
known political figures, people have matured and shown their mellowness
through electoral preferences much less biased by kinship networks, and consol-
idated much more locally than before.98 Political maturation of parties and the
search for a compromise is becoming the only way to achieve results, despite
that Ukrainian politicians often still tend to act “Soviet”, refusing to acknow-
ledge what they find uncomfortable, be it “democratic” or not.
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